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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 7177 
!VELLA HUTCHISON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a companion to Case No. 7176, State of 
Utah vs. HowardS. Byington. Upon stipulation of coun-
sel, and good cause appearing therefor, an order was 
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entered by the Chief Justice, permitting consolidation of 
the cases for argument before this Court. 
The Appellant, I vella Hutchison, having been tried 
before the District Court of the First Judicial District, 
County of Cache, State of Utah, was found guilty by 
verdict of jury of Perjury in Second Degree, fined 
$250.00 and sentenced to 90 days in the county jail,-the 
sentence to be suspended upon payment of the fine. Ap-
pellant has requested that this Honorable Court set 
aside the verdict and sentence and that the fine be re-
funded to her. 
Under Section 103-43-1.10 U.C.A. 1943, it is provided 
in part: 
"A. person is guilty of perjury who (1) 
Swears ***that he will testify ***in or in con-
nection with, any action ***in which an oath is re-
quired by law ***and who in such action, ***will-
fully and knowingly testifies, ***any matter to 
be true which he knows to he false.'' 
Section 103-43-10 U.C.A. 1943 reads in part as fol-
lows: 
''A person is guilty of perjury in the first 
degree who commits perjury as to any material 
matter in or in connection with any action or 
special proeeding, ***. '' 
Perjury in the second degree is designated by the 
Legislature, in Section 103-43-11, as follows: 
A person is guilty of perjury in the second 
r1egree who commits perjury under circumstances 
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not amounting to perjury in the first degree.'' 
The record discloses, by State's exhibit "C ", that 
a Decree of Divorce was entered on the 9th day of May, 
1947, absolving the bonds of matrimony existing between 
one Howard S. Byington and one Lavina Byington; and 
that by the provisions of the Decree, Mrs. Byington was 
awarded custody of the four children of the partie~s and 
$50.00 per month for their support and maintenance, 
payable on the 20th day of l\fay 1947 and each month 
thereafter. A further sum of $1.00 per year was awarded 
to Lavina Byington as alimony, payable June 1, 1947 
and annually thereafter. 
State's exhibit "C" further reflects that on or 
about the 26th of November 1947, Lavina Byington filed 
an affidavit in which she set forth as a fact, the failure 
of Howard S. Byington to make the payments as ordered 
and further that "His failure to pay said sums has been 
willful and intentional.'' Lavina Byington, in the afore-
said affidavit prayer that the Court enter an order 
directing him to show cause why he should not he pun-
ished for contempt for failure to make the aforesaid 
payments. The order was issued by the Court on or 
about the 26th day of November 194 7 and was regularly 
heard by the Court on the 8th day of December. At the 
hearing Lavina Byington appeared personally and wa;s 
represented by her counsel. Howard S. Byington ap-
peared without counsel. The Court heard the testimony 
of Lavina Byington as to her information concerning 
Howard S. Byington's income since the entry of the 
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decree. Byington also was questioned at that time by 
counsel for Mrs. Byington and by the Court in respect 
to his earnings and failure to pay alimony. 
It wa;s during the course of these proceedings on the 
Order to Show Cause that Byington, among other things, 
was questioned as to whether or not he had remarried. 
Byington answered ''yes.'' He further testified that he 
was married in the state of :Jiontana but that he did not 
know of the exact time or place. His recollection concern-
ing the marriage was so hazy that the Court a'S ked : 
"Where is your wife 1" 
Answer: ''Home.'' 
Court : ''Hasn't she been able to tell you 
wJiere you got marri·ed 1'' 
Answer: ''Well, I guess she could.'' 
Court: "Then I'm going to give you just 
about five minutes to get down thre, Mr. Byington, 
and bring her back her·e. We 'II take a recess for 
about ten minutes so far as this case is concerned, 
and you may go with the Sheriff and bring her 
back.'' 
(Page 56, State's Exhibit "B") 
Byington returned to Court with the Appellant who 
when called to the stand testified as follows: 
"Q What's your name~ 
A !vella Hutchison. 
Q Will you say that again~ 
A !vella Hutchison. 
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Q How do you spell it 1 I-v-e-1-l-a 1 
A Yes. 
Q Hutchison'? 
~\ Yes. 
Q Don't you go by the nan1e of Byington? 
A Yes. 
Q How long have you been going by that 
name' 
A "\Yell, I've been going by it, too, for the 
last month. 
Q You've been what' 
:A Going by it definitely for the last month. 
Q Well, how long--
A But we weren't married until the first 
of December. 
Q How long did you go by it indefinitely' 
A Since last October. 
Q When were you married? 
A First of this month. 
Q Where~ 
A Montana 
Q What¥ 
A Montana. 
Q Where at in Montana¥ 
A Can't tell you. 
Q Have you got a marriage license~ 
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A Did have, yes 
Q Where is it~ 
A. It is either in my personal belongings at 
my mother's home or somewhere between Buel 
Idaho, and Blackfoot and here.'' ' 
Based upon the foregoing testimony, the Appellant 
was charged and convicted of the crime of perjury in the 
Rrrond degree. 
PROPOSITION NO. 1 
THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING MARRIAGE 
\VERE PROPER AND PERTINENT TO THE 
COURT. 
As set forth in Proposition No. 1 of the Respon-
dent's Brief, Case No. 7176, it is the Respondent's po·si-
tion that questions to Byington concerning his marriage 
were relevant to the final determination and disposition 
of the case then before the Court. Counsel for Appellant 
argues that testimony concerning marriage was irregul-
arly received and immaterial to the issues and that the 
only -reason that could be given for the Appellant to 
testify was either "to have her perjure herself or in-
criminate herself." There is nothing in the record to 
support this contention or such a premise. Byington testi-
fied that he was married to the Appellant but was very 
vagu.e concerning the time or place of the marriage and 
it was the suggestion of the Court that he return with 
Appellant in order that his m·emory in these particulars 
could be refreshed. When Appellant was asked to take 
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the stand and questioned concerning her 1narriage with 
BYI.ncion there was no reason for the Court to believe 
• 0 ' 
that she would falsify. It would appear to be Counsel's 
position that the Court had every reason to believe Ap-
pellant to be Byington's wife; that she could not be com-
pelled to testify against her husband; and therefore 
that she should not be called as a witness. On the other 
hand, the Appellant claims the Court compelled her to 
perjure herself because he had every reason to believe 
her not to be the wife of Byington. Such arguments are 
not consistent. 
In 48 C.J. 864, the following appears: 
''A privileged witness, such as a defendant in 
a criminal trial or a person whose testimony may 
tend to incriminate him may be prosecuted for 
perjury or false swearing if he waives his privi-
lege and testifies falsely. A fortiori, where there 
is no privilege, the witness cannot escape liability 
for false testimony. But, if he has the privilege 
and does not waive it but testifies because illegally 
compelled to do so, he is not liable for perjury s·o 
committed.'' 
PROPOSITION NO. 2 
THE STATE11ENTS INVOLVED WERE VOLUN-
TARILYMADE 
Appellant urges in her brief that the question of 
marriage was incriminating and in violation of the pro-
tection afforded a witnes·s under Article 1, Section 12 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 8ection 
105-1-10 Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
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Therefore, could it not be well argued that had 
I vella Hutchison told the truth before the Court, and a 
prosecution for the acts revealed by heT testimony was 
thereafter instituted, she would be immune from such 
prosecution by establishing that the matter originated 
through testimony and evidence she was compelled to 
produce by order of Court. 
As far as the Appellant is concerned there can be 
no question that the provjsions of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, to the effect that ''the accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against self," is not pertinent 
to this matter. !vella Hutchison was not accused of a 
crim·e. She was called as a witness to testify in civil 
proceedings pending before the Court. 
The determ1nation as to whether or not the questions 
were self-incriminating presupposes a further proposi-
tion of law that in the event !vella Hutchison had truth-
fully answered the questions submitted she would subject 
herself to criminal prosecution. It may be that it could 
be well argued that a truthful answer to the questions 
would have been an assurance of immunity from prosecu-
tion. 
There is a line of well accepted authority to the 
effect that a person who is brought into Court under sub-
poena or otherwise and co~pelled to testify on subjects 
which may prove self-incriminating, has thereby gained 
immunity from prosecution concerning such matters. 
In the case of Peop1e vs. Schwarz, 248 Pac. 990, 78 
Cal App. 561, the following was stated: 
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''The weight of authority clearly supports 
the proposition that one who is brought into court 
under a subpoena and testifies pursuant the·reto 
acts under con1pulsion. In People Y~. Courtney, 
94 N.Y. 490, 493, it was said, 'The Constitution 
primarily refers to c01npulsion exercised through 
the process of the courts,' and not to the sup-
posed n10ral coercion which impels a person to 
testify lest adverse inferences might be drawn 
from his silence. In Boyd vs. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746, it was said: 
'Constitutional provisions for the secur-
ity of persons and property should be liber-
ally construed. A close and literal construc-
tion deprives them of half their efficasy, 
and leads to gradual depreciation of the 
right, as if it consisted more in sound than 
in substance. It is the duty of courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the 
citizen, and against any stealthy encroach-
ments thereon. Their motto should be obsta 
principiis.' 
"And in United States vs. Kallas (D.C.) 272 
F. 7 42-752, it was said, further: 
'How can it be said that, if a court re-
quired an accused to answer upon the witness 
chair, with the alternative of going to jail 
if he refused, it was such compulsion as to 
invalidate the evidence so obtained, and, at 
the same time, that a prisoner questioned in 
jail by his captor was not compelled to give 
evidence against himself.' 
. 'Sue~ a co~rse would be to very nearly, 
If not quite, blind oneself as to what consti-
tutes compulsion. As above pointed out the 
compulsion forbidden by the amendmen.'t--or 
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at least included in its prohibition--is com-
pulsion exercised through the process of the 
court. The eommitment by which the peti-
tioner in the present case was held in jail is 
no less a compelling process than were he in 
court and ordered upon the witness chair for 
examination. ***While it may be that manv 
know of their rights, and, even when i~ 
prison, have the will and courage to stand 
upon them, there certainly are others who do 
not.' 
"In Re Simon, 297 F. 942, 34 A.L.R. 140-1, it 
was contended that a bankrupt who had failed to 
obey a subpoena was not guilty of having violated 
an order of court. But it was said by the Circuit 
Court of Appeals: 
'It cannot be denied, however, that a 
subpoena is a writ. ***It will not be denied 
that a writ is a mandatory precept issued 
by a eourt. Commanding the person to whom 
it is addressed to do or refrain from doing 
some act therein specified. Because it is man-
datory, and is issued by a court, it is an order 
of the court. ***The time was when a witness 
could not be compelled to go to court and 
testify, and if he attended and gave testimony 
his action was thought .to bear the semblance 
of n1aintenance, and he ran the risk, if he 
came forward to testify, of being afterwards 
sued for maintenance by the party against 
whom he had spoken. *** A subpoena is a 
writ or process, and is mandatory in its 
nature, being a positive command. A writ of 
subpoena, like a writ of scire facias, fieri 
facias, habeas corpus, certiorari, supersed-
eas, and the various other writs, 'are all 
commands or orders of court that something 
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be done.' ••• In Burns vs. Superior Com~t, 
140 Cal. 1, 3, 7~~. P. 597. 598, the court sa1d 
that the very etymology of the word 't-'U b-
poena' signifies ·an order with a penaltY 
for disobedience.' In the case of Scott V8. 
Shields, 8 Cal. App. 12, 96 P. 385, a subpoena 
is said to be: ''A writ or order directed to a 
person and requiring his attendance at a 
particular time and place to testify as a 
witness.' '' 
''The California cases cited in the foregoing 
quotation involved questions of certiorari and con-
tempt, and therefore are dissimilar from the one 
here presented. But they are in harmony with the 
consensus of general authorities that a subpoena 
is a writ, an order, for the disobedience of which 
the person named therein may be punished ac.: 
cording to the expressed will of the Legislature. 
"It has been suggested that the benefit of 
the immunity clause is not availab~e to these 
defendants because they failed to 'claim the privi-
lege.' It is obvious, however, that under such 
statutes there is no privilege. In Bradley v. 
Clark, 133 Cal. 196, 65 P. 395, the Supreme Court 
construed an identical provision in the Purity of 
Elections Law (St. 1893, p. 12). It was there said: 
'If the matter sought to be elicted by the 
questions was matter embraced within the 
purview of any of the sections ***and if, with 
the defendant as a 'person offending,' the 
witnes·s himself was also a 'person offend-
ing,' then by the express provisions of section 
32, and by the authority of this court. in Ex 
parte Cohen, 104 Cal. 524, 43 Am. St. Rep. 
127, the witness could not claim immunity, 
and should not have compelled to testify.' 
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"We think, therefore, that the appellants 
Frankfort and Goldner were 'compelled to testify 
under oath' concerning the acts, transactions, 
matters, and things constituting the offense al-
leged in the indictment herein, and that by the 
express inhibitions of the statute they were thus 
guaranteed immunity from prosecution there-
for. For the reasons stated, the judgments, as to 
these two appellants, must be reversed." 
The simple fact remains that Appellant falsified 
under oath. How and in what manner she \Vas brought 
into Court as a witness is wholly immaterial to the is-
sues. 
14 Am. Juris. 371, par. 171, discusses the "inherent 
powers of courts.'' The text states that these powers are 
such as result from the very nature of its organization 
and are essential to its existence and protection and to 
the due administration of justice. Among the powers 
discussed therein, the following appears: 
''Another illustration of the inherent powers 
of courts is the power to administer oaths in the 
trial of cases. This power is implied in the 
jurisidction to try cases and to receive the testi-
mony of witnesses under oath, and it need not be 
conferred by statute. The power to maintain 
order, to secure the attendance of witnesses, to 
the end that the rights of the parties may be as-
certained, and to enforce process to the end that 
effect may be given to judgments must inhere in 
every court or the purpose of its creation fails. 
Without such power no other could be exercised." 
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PROPOSITION NO. 3 
TRIAL JUDGE 'VAS NOT DISQUALIFIED 
According to the record, as set forth in Appellant's 
Brief, prior to the trial of this case, attorney for Appel-
lant filed application and petition for a change of judge 
upon the affidavit of api>ellant to the effect that the pre-
siding judge, before whom the action was pending, was 
prejudiced against her and that she believed said judge 
would not grant her a fair and impartial trial. 
It is respectfully submitted that this is the only in-
dication of record that there was any doubt ·concerningl 
the ability of the Court to hear the matter fairly. The 
affidavit, which at the most states a conclusion of ap-
pellant, is the only evidence that the judge was either 
biased or prejudiced. 
A review of the record and pages 3 to 15 of the 
transcript disclosed that in the selection of the jury the 
court absolutely insured that !vella Hutchinson would 
be afforded a fair trial. Nowhere in the proceedings does 
it appear that this attitude changed during the course of 
the trial. This Court has repeatedly held that the motion 
seeking to disqualify a trial judge on the ground of bias 
and prejudice is addressed to the discretion of the judge 
and he must decide the motion the same as any other 
matter which comes before him. Musser vs. Third Judi-
cial District Court, 106 Utah 373, 148 Pac. (2d) 802. An 
affidavit stating that the judge is biased and prejudiced 
does not show disqualification. Cox vs. Dixie Packing Co., 
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72 Utah 23·6, 269 Pac. 1000. See also Haslam vs. Morri-
son, ______ Utah------, 190 Pac. (2d) 520 and Willie vs. Local 
Realty Co., ______ Utah (April 28, 1948). 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant was 
found guilty upon evidence which conclusively establishes 
her guilt. To say that the manner in which she was 
brought into Court exonerates or condones her delin-
quency as a matter of law, would be a travail upon Jus-
tice. The verdict and the sentence below must stand. 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney Gener.al of Utah 
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN, 
Assistant AUo·rney General 
Att,orneys fo·r Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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